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Summary. This article examines the use of Telegram as a means of political communica-
tion by the ruling political elite in Russia (both external, i.e., communication with the 
society and other political forces, and internal, i.e., between different, often rival, groups 
within the elite itself). While Telegram is illegal at the official level, and attempts have been 
made to block it in Russia since April 2018, unofficially the Russian authorities continue to 
actively use Telegram channels for political communication and influencing public opinion 
as well as for monitoring the mood of the public. What is the reason for this ambivalent 
attitude toward Telegram? What makes it so attractive for the Russian establishment? How 
are the authorities using Telegram for their own purposes? Answering these questions is 
the main goal of this study. 
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„Telegram“ kaip politinės komunikacijos priemonė  
ir jos naudojimas Rusijos valdančiojo elito rate 
Santrauka. Šiame straipsnyje nagrinėjama, kaip socialinis tinklas „Telegram“ valdančiojo 
Rusijos politinio elito naudojamas kaip politinės komunikacijos priemonė (tiek išorinei 
komunikacijai, t. y. bendravimui su visuomene ir kitomis politinėmis jėgomis, tiek vi-
dinei, t. y. tarp skirtingų, dažnai konkuruojančių elito grupių). Nors „Telegram“ oficialiai 
yra neteisėtas ir nuo 2018 m. balandžio Rusijoje buvo bandoma jį blokuoti, neoficialiai 
Rusijos valdžia ir toliau aktyviai naudoja „Telegram“ kanalus politinei komunikacijai, 
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taip pat siekdama formuoti visuomenės nuomonę ir stebėti visuomenės nuotaikas. Kokios 
yra tokio dviprasmiško požiūrio į „Telegram“ priežastys? Kuo šis kanalas toks patrauklus 
Rusijos valdančiajam sluoksniui? Kaip valdžios institucijos naudoja „Telegram“ savo tiks­
lams? Atsakymai į šiuos klausimus yra pagrindinis šio tyrimo tikslas.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: „Telegram“, „Telegram“ kanalai, politinė komunikacija, Rusija, 
Rusijos valdžia, Rusijos politinis elitas.
Introduction
For a long time, until the beginning of the 2000s, the scientific com-
munity had been dominated by the optimistic idea that the Internet 
and the new information and communication technologies (ICT) 
would bring technological and social progress with their improve-
ment and should therefore certainly contribute to democratization1 
and “constitute a threat to authoritarian regimes.”2 Color revolutions 
and mass protest movements of the 2000s and the early 2010s (The 
Orange Revolution (2004) and Euromaidan (2014) in Ukraine, the 
Arab spring (2010–2012), protests against electoral fraud in Iran 
(2009) and Russia (2011–2013) etc.), during which social media 
played an important mobilizing function, were seen by many schol-
ars as obvious evidence in support of this optimistic point of view.3 
1 Hacker K., van Dijk J., What is digital democracy? Digital democracy: Issues of theo-
ry and practice, London, UK: SAGE, 2000; Astrom J., “Digital democracy: Ideas, 
intentions and initiatives in Swedish local governments”, in:  Gibson R., Römelle X., 
Ward S. (eds.), Electronic Democracy: Mobilisation, organization and participation via 
new ICTs,  London, UK: Routledge, 2004; Gore A., “Forging a New Athenian Age of 
Democracy”, Intermedia, Vol. 22 (2), 1995, p. 4–6; Ferdinand P. (ed.), The Internet, 
Democracy and Democratization, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000; Tsagarousia-
nou, R., Tambini, D., Bryan C. (eds.), Cyberdemocracy. Technology, cities and civic 
networks, London/New York: Routledge, 1998; Tsagarousianou, R., Tambini, D., Bryan 
C. (eds.), Cyberdemocracy. Technology, cities and civic networks, London/New York: 
Routledge, 1998.  
2 Boas T. C., Kalathil S., Open networks, closed regimes: The impact of the Internet on 
authoritarian rule, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2003, p. 1.
3 See, for instance: Diamond L., “Liberation technology”, Journal of Democracy, 22 (3), 
2010, p. 69–83; Oreskovic A., “Egyptian Activist Creates Image Issue for Google,” 
Reuters, 12 Februar, 2011; Shirky C., “The political power of social media”, Foreign 
affairs, Vol. 90 (1), 2011, p. 28–41.
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However, at the beginning of the 2000s, more skeptical opinions be-
come widespread, claiming that authoritarian regimes are capable of 
not only meeting new technological challenges, but also using new 
communication technologies to strengthen their own power and ob-
tain more control over society.4 These viewpoints were supported by 
many examples of nondemocratic countries, whose authorities man-
aged to block unwanted Internet sites or even learned to use mod-
ern technology for their internal5 and foreign policy goals.6 How-
ever, it seems that the impact of the Internet and the ITC on politics 
in nondemocratic countries is far more complex.7 We need to take 
into account various aspects of this influence, its multi­vector and 
multi-level nature. The research on the impact of Internet-mediated 
communication on political communication in the nondemocratic or 
4 Kalathil S., Boas T.C., “The Internet and state control in authoritarian regimes: China, 
Cuba, and the counterrevolution”, First Monday, Vol. 6 (8), 2001; Kalathil S., Boas 
T.C., Open networks, closed regimes: The impact of the Internet on authoritarian rule, 
Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2003; Aday, S., Farrell, H., Lynch, M., Sides, 
J., Kelly, J., & Zuckerman, E., “Blogs and Bullets: New Media in Contentious Poli-
tics”, Peaceworks (65), 2010, United States Institute of Peace, p. 1–36; Deibert R., 
“Cyberspace under siege”, Journal of Democracy, 26 (3), 2015, p. 64–78; Morozov 
E., The net delusion: How not to liberate the world. London, UK: Allen Lane, 2011.
5 Deibert R., Rohozinski R., “Beyond Denial: Introducing Next Generation Access 
Controls”, in: Deibert R. et al. eds., Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, 
and Rule in Cyberspace, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010, p. 3–13; Mackinnon R., 
“China’s ‘Networked Authoritarianism’”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 22 (2), 2011, 
p. 32–46; Cook S., “China’s growing army of paid internet commentators”, Freedom at 
Issue, (October 10), 2011; Göbel C., “The information dilemma: How ICT strengthen or 
weaken authoritarian rule”, Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, 115(4), 2013, p. 385–402. 
6 Hussain M. M., Howard, P. N., State power 2.0: Authoritarian entrenchment and politi-
cal engagement worldwide, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2014; Rutenberg J. “RT, Sputnik and 
Russia’s new theory of war”, The New York Times Magazine,  September 13, 2017; 
Shane S., “The fake Americans Russia created to influence the election”, The New York 
Times, September 7, 2017; Michaelsen M., Glasius M., “Authoritarian Practices in the 
Digital Age”, International Journal of Communication, 12 (2018), p. 3788–3794; Maré-
chal, N., “Networked authoritarianism and the geopolitics of information: understanding 
Russian Internet policy”, Media and Communication, 5(1), 2017, p. 29–41.
7 Toepfl F., “Making Sense of the News in a Hybrid Regime: How Young Russians 
Decode State TV and an Oppositional Blog”, Journal of Communication, April 2013, 
Vol. 63 (2), p. 244–265, here p. 244; Torres­Soriano M. R. “Internet as a driver of po-
litical change: Cyber­pessimists and cyber­optimists”, Journal of the Spanish Institute 
of Strategic Studies, Vol. 1 (1), 2013, p. 1–22.
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authoritarian context is mostly focused on the following three as-
pects: 1) use of the Internet and social media to organize opposition 
protests; 2) use of the new ICT by nondemocratic regimes to control 
their societies; 3) attempts of nondemocratic regimes to influence po-
litical processes and political decision-making in democratic coun-
tries. Still, a very important aspect of political communication is left 
out of sight, namely the fact that, even in an authoritarian context, the 
ruling elites may require a communicative platform for external and 
internal communication. Although this need is hard to satisfy through 
the official public sphere and traditional media, a new informal plat-
form of communication could be of great help. Telegram is one of 
such new messaging services frequently used for informal political 
communication in several countries today. The role of Telegram as a 
means of political communication has not been studied well, prob-
ably due to its low popularity in developed democracies. Neverthe-
less, thanks to its technical characteristics, as well as to its established 
image (as a safe means of communication uncontrolled by the state), 
this messenger has gained notoriety, especially in nondemocracies 
or not fully democratic countries (as evidenced by its popularity in 
such countries as Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Brazil). Unfortunately, 
while there are relatively many studies on other social media in the 
nondemocratic context8, there is little research devoted to the role of 
8 See, for instance:  Bulovsky A., “Authoritarian communication on social media: The 
relationship between democracy and leaders’ digital communicative practices”, In-
ternational Communication Gazette, 81 (1), 2018, p. 20–45; King G., Pan J., Roberts 
M. E., “How the Chinese government fabricates social media posts for strategic dis-
traction, not engaged argument”, American Political Science Review, 111(3), 2017, 
p. 484–501; Reuter O.J., Szakonyi D., “Online Social Media and Political Awareness 
in Authoritarian Regimes”, British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, vol. 45 (01), 2015, January, p. 29–51; Han R., “Manufacturing consent in 
cyberspace: China’s ‘fifty­cent army’”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 2, 2015, 
p. 105–134; White S., McAllister I.  “Did Russia (nearly) have a Facebook revolution 
in 2011? Social media’s challenge to authoritarianism”, Political Studies Association, 
34(1), 2014, p. 72–84; Lim M., “Clicks, cabs, and coffee houses: Social media and 
oppositional movements in Egypt, 2004–2011”, Journal of Communication, 62, 2012, 
p. 231–248; Pearce K., Kendzior S., “Networked authoritarianism and social media in 
Azerbaijan”, Journal of Communication, 62, 2012, p. 283–298.
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Telegram as a means of political communication (a rare exception, 
for instance, is Azadeh Akbari and Rashid Gabdulhakov’s9 article 
“Platform Surveillance and Resistance in Iran and Russia: The Case 
of Telegram”). This paper attempts to fill the gap and examine the 
use of Telegram by the Russian ruling elite as a channel of political 
communication.
The peculiar phenomenon of Telegram appeared in the Russian 
public discourse in the middle of the 2010s. Telegram channels creat-
ed a new media environment, strongly critical and politicized, which 
quickly began to gain popularity among Russians. Along with tradi-
tional media and mainstream social networks (in Russia, primarily 
VKontakte, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Odnoklassniki), Tele-
gram started to have a tangible impact on the sociopolitical agenda 
and on the formation of public opinion. This led to the ambiguous 
relations between Telegram and the Russian authorities. On the one 
hand, Telegram is officially outlawed in Russia, and Roskomnadzor 
(the Russian Federal Supervision Agency for Information Technol-
ogies and Communications) has been trying to block its operation 
since April 2018. On the other hand, prior to the formal decision to 
block Telegram in Russia, many press services of various govern-
ment departments had been using Telegram channels as a convenient 
and effective means of communicating their official position to the 
general public. As soon as Roskomnadzor started restricting access to 
Telegram, all official channels owned by government agencies were 
forced to close. Nevertheless, not only did the Russian authorities 
continue to monitor the main Telegram channels (including high-
ranking government officials from the presidential apparatus of the 
Russian Federation), but they also unofficially control several news 
and political channels or pay for the publication of materials on inde-
pendent channels. In this regard, the questions to ask would be: what 
is the reason for this dual attitude to Telegram by the Russian au-
9 Akbari A., Gabdulhakov R., “Platform Surveillance and Resistance in Iran and Russia: 
The Case of Telegram”, Surveillance & Society, 17(1/2), 2019, p. 223–231.
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thorities? What makes it so attractive for representatives of the Rus-
sian establishment? How do they try to use Telegram and meanwhile 
bring it under control? What are the prospects of Telegram in Russia 
as a channel of political communication? In attempting to answer 
these questions, the main goal of this study is to find out what role 
Telegram plays today in the political communication of the Russian 
political elite. 
The theoretical framework of this article is based on the paradigm 
of cyber realism, according to which the Internet “is an extraordinary 
communications tool that provides a range of new opportunities for 
people, communities, businesses, and government,”10 but “for every 
empowering or enlightening aspect of the wired life, there will also 
be dimensions that are malicious, perverse, or rather ordinary.”11 In a 
political context, this means that “the same technologies which give 
voice to democratic activists living under authoritarian rule can also 
be harnessed by their oppressors.”12 The research is also built on the 
thesis that modern undemocratic regimes have quite successfully 
(at least in the short term) learned to solve the “dictator’s dilemma” 
(with regard to Internet technologies and the risks to the regime that 
they bring with them),13 skillfully combining various ways of deal-
ing with the modern ICT: from blocking the online platforms most 
dangerous to its power to various uses of these technologies to influ-
ence the public opinion and strengthen control over their countries. 
In addition, I proceed from the assumption that today, the Internet 
and social media provide an important channel of communication 
10 “Principles of Technorealism”, Available at: http://www.technorealism.org (accessed 
8 June 2019).
11 Ibid. 
12 Deibert R., Rohozinski R., “Liberation vs. control: The future of cyberspace”, Journal 
of Democracy, 21, 2010, p. 43–57. Here p. 43. 
13 The essence of the dictator’s dilemma within the context of the ICT is that the ruling 
regime has to balance between the risk of losing control over its country as a result of 
democratic development of the civil society caused by the Internet, and the economic 
and technical backwardness that the country can plunge into if new technologies or 
new forms of communication are simply banned.
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not only in democracies, but also in nondemocratic countries, whose 
ruling elites also need both external (reaching out to the society) and 
internal (between different elite groups) communication, but under 
the conditions of authoritarian or hybrid regimes, they cannot always 
achieve these goals. In democratic countries, this communication 
takes place mainly through open discussions in the public sphere.14 
The citizens have the opportunity to convey their opinions to the au-
thorities, and the ruling political elite can clearly monitor the public 
mood. In nondemocratic countries, public debate, open discussions 
between the government and the people, and dialogue between vari-
ous groups of the political elite are largely difficult and sometimes 
not secure. However, the very need for such communication per-
sists – it plays the role of “social glue,” sticking together various 
social groups into a single whole. Since it is completely impossible 
to fulfill this need within the framework of an authoritarian public 
sphere, the communicative activity begins to shift toward semi-pub-
lic or partially public spaces, turning to other channels, forms, and 
ways of communication. In this study, we will consider the case of 
the use of the Telegram messenger platform by Russia’s ruling elite 
as an example of such kind of channels.
In the first part, I summarize a brief history of the emergence and 
transformation of Telegram into one of the most popular messengers 
in Russia and consider the reasons for its wide popularity, including 
its attractiveness for a politically active public. Next, I explore the 
14 Today – in the era of the Internet and social media – the concept of the public sphere 
should be used with caution and with multiple reservations. The modern public sp-
here seems to be far from being a Habermas­idealized public sphere of coffee shops 
or salons, and it is far from being merely a place of rational deliberative discourse. 
Habermas’s idealistic understanding of the public sphere is “not consistent with the 
real discourse in social media where discussions are often far from an unbiased and 
disinterested weighing of different arguments and finding the most logical and ratio-
nal solution” (See: Salikov A., “Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas and rethinking the 
public sphere in the age of social media”, Russian Sociological Review. 2018. Vol. 17. 
No. 4. p. 88–102. Here: p. 89). It is rather a complex conglomeration of various types 
of peoples, more or less open and critical, in which discursive practices are carried out 
and information and opinions are exchanged. 
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political segment of Telegram channels, their audience, and influence 
on the public opinion. In the second part, I analyze the level of pen-
etration and the use of political Telegram channels by the Russian 
authorities and different groups within the Russian establishment. Fi-
nally, I summarize all research results in the Conclusions and Discus-
sion part of the paper and outline the issues that need to be clarified in 
further research on the political role of Telegram in Russia.
1. The Phenomenon of Telegram in Russia
Telegram first appeared in 2013 in Russia. It was launched by the 
brothers Nikolai and Pavel Durov, the founders of VKontakte, one of 
the largest and most popular social networking sites (SNS) in Russia 
and countries of the former USSR. From the very beginning, Telegram 
positioned itself as a reliable and secure means of communication, 
guaranteeing confidentiality to its customers, protecting them from 
the excessive curiosity of the security forces – a feature which was 
in high demand in Russia, as well as in some other non-democratic 
countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, UAE, Uzbekistan, Belarus). Until late 
2015, Telegram was a little-known message service used mainly by 
advanced Internet users who were concerned about the confidential-
ity of their communications. They used Telegram because it provided 
them with a high level of security (at that time only Telegram had 
protected end-2-end-encryption with self-deleting messages, which 
at the time was not the case with the more popular message applica-
tions in Russia – WhatsApp and Viber). In September 2015, channels 
appeared in Telegram – chat rooms that represent something between 
a news feed and a blog on a specific topic. A distinctive feature of 
Telegram channels, compared with chats in other instant messengers, 
is the opportunity for the channel’s author to share content with an 
unlimited circle of readers while maintaining their anonymity. More-
over, channels do not provide any feedback, subscribers cannot com-
ment and rate the posts. The only criterion of a channel’s popularity 
is the number of subscribers, and the main form of feedback between 
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authors and readers is users either subscribing or unsubscribing from 
the channel.
In 2016, these channels confidently gained popularity, and begin-
ning with late 2016, when the number of subscribers to individu-
al channels began to reach several thousands, Telegram became a 
significant platform for broadcasting various kinds of information, 
from rumors and outright speculations to completely reliable insider 
information, compromising materials, and leaks.15 From this point 
on, Telegram channels started to attract the interest of the Russian 
authorities, which only intensified after individual channels began 
to reach several tens of thousands of subscribers and the major me-
dia outlets began to use them as sources. Telegram’s popularity was 
not affected even by its official ban and attempts to block it.16 At 
the end of 2018, according to Telegram Analytics, there were about 
63 000 channels identifying themselves as Russian.17 In 2018, a total 
15 An example of this kind of information spreading via Telegram is the publication 
of a scanned report of the results of an internal investigation about the crash of a 
Tupolev Tu-154 jetliner of the Russian Defense Ministry over the Black Sea while en 
route to a Russian military base in Syria on December 25, 2016. On May 31, 2017, 
the anonymous Telegram channel Captain Vrungel (@capt404), the authors of which 
present themselves as insiders from the Russian military establishment, posted scans 
of the document containing a brief account of the course and causes of the disaster. 
The documents published on the channel reported that the crews flying to Syria were 
exhausted and lost their bearings. Another example of using Telegram in this way 
is the campaign to discredit the head of Russian state development bank VEB Igor 
Shuvalov, launched by the Telegram channel Futlyar ot violoncheli (@rospress). The 
authors of the channel accused Shuvalov of corruption and demonstrative wealth and 
listed luxury items and real estate, which, according to them, belong to Shuvalov.
16 The official reason for blocking Telegram in Russia is Telegram’s noncompliance with 
the so­called Yarovaya law (passed in July 2016), according to which telecommuni-
cations service operators are required to store the content of voice calls, data, images, 
and text messages of their customers for six months. However, Telegram’s manage-
ment refused to store and provide the keys for decrypting user correspondence to the 
FSB. As a result of the trial between Telegram and Roskomnadzor, the court took the 
side of the Russian authorities and ruled to block Telegram in the territory of the Rus-
sian Federation. 
17 “Itogi 2018 goda dlja Telegram v cifrah” [Telegram 2018 results in numbers]. Availa-
ble at: https://tgstat.ru/articles/Itogi-2018-goda-dlya-Telegram-v-cifrah-12-29 (acces-
sed 8 June 2019).
ISSN 1392-1681   eISSN 2424-6034   Politologija 2019/3 (95)
92
of almost 40 000 new Russian-language channels appeared.18 Thus, 
despite the official ban, Telegram not only continues to work in Rus-
sia without significant problems, but even continues to grow and re-
mains one of the most popular message services in Russia.
One of the important features of Telegram is its audience, which 
has a certain specificity that distinguishes it from the audience of the 
other two most popular messaging services in Russia – WhatsApp 
and Viber. In the second half of the 2010s, Telegram channels began 
attracting a specific audience of media content consumers largely 
focused on the constant consumption of information in an easily ac-
cessible and concise form. This way to deliver content is especially 
in demand among young people, and given the increasing politiciza-
tion of this group, which became apparent from the 2011–2013 pro-
tests, it is quite understandable why Telegram and its channels have 
become a peculiar phenomenon in the Russian sociopolitical life of 
the 2010s. In absolute figures, the audience of Telegram channels 
is not very large – about 3.4 million daily users at the end of 2018. 
For comparison, WhatsApp has a daily audience in Russia of about 
16.4 million, Viber – 9.3 million (All data for October 201819). An 
approximate profile of a Telegram user can be described based on 
a study conducted by the Telegram analytical service TGStat.ru in 
April 2019, in which more than 82 000 subscribers and authors of di-
verse channels were surveyed.20 According to this research, Russians 
aged 18–24 (27%) and aged 25–34 (38%) made up the two largest 
shares of Telegram users. Thus, Telegram is primarily popular among 
people from 18 to 34 years of age, the population group which the 
18 Ibid. 
19 “Auditorija zablokirovannogo Telegram priblizilas’ k rekordnym pokazateljam”. [The 
banned Telegram’s audience about to set a record]. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/
technology_and_media/14/12/2018/5c13a59c9a7947585724bcd6 (accessed 28 June 
2019).
20 “Issledovanie auditorii Telegram 2019” [Telegram audience research 2019]. Available 
at:   https://tgstat.ru/research (accessed 8 June 2019).
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Russian authorities are actively trying to influence. By occupation, 
this group consists of students or young professionals with university 
degrees. According to the data of sociological studies, they form the 
most protest­minded group in Russia, who are unsatisfied with much 
of the country’s policy and who see no prospects for themselves un-
der the current regime.21 In addition to young people, Telegram is 
also popular among another important population group, namely the 
middle-aged, well-educated citizens with higher-than-average in-
comes.22 Among them are many intellectuals, journalists, managers 
of advertising and PR agencies, IT specialists, and officials who play 
a key role in shaping public opinion.23 Most users are from Mos-
cow (35.9%) and St. Petersburg (14.4%) – the cities where the most 
mass protests took place. In other words, Telegram’s audience is 
politicized, active, young, and educated. Many of them consciously 
use Telegram as an alternative source of information and for secure 
communication on political topics (which is relevant, given the pe-
riodic administrative and criminal prosecution for likes and reposts 
in Russia). This does not mean that Telegram’s audience is mostly 
oppositional; Telegram is often used by otherwise loyal authorities 
and those who cannot openly make critical remarks even in cases of 
a serious disagreement with the official policy of the ruling regime, 
because it would automatically threaten their career and well-being. 
Thus, for the Russian ruling elite, Telegram is a resource that allows 
them to reach a difficult but very important part of the population, 
21 “Doklad «Novaja protestnaja volna: mify i real’nost’»”. [Report “New Protest Wave: 
Myths and Reality”]. Available at: http://civilfund.ru/mat/view/37 (accessed 8 June 
2019); «Molodezhnyj» protest: prichiny i potencial. Uslovija zhizni i mirooshhushhenie 
rossijskoj molodezhi. [“Youth” protest: causes and potential. Living conditions and view 
of life of the Russian youth]. Available at: http://cepr.su/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/
Молодежный­протест_причины­и­потенциал.pdf (accessed 8 June 2019).
22 “Issledovanie auditorii Telegram 2019” [Telegram audience research 2019]. Available 
at:   https://tgstat.ru/research (accessed 8 June 2019).
23 Potupchik, Kristina. «Zapreshhennyj» Telegram. Putevoditel’ po samomu skandal’no-
mu internet-messendzheru. [The “forbidden” Telegram. A guide to the scandalous 
messenger]. M.: Buki Vedi, 2019.
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which is almost impossible to achieve with the help of traditional 
media.
Political and news channels largely constitute the most original 
content of Telegram and occupy a central position among Telegram 
channels, even if their share has decreased significantly over the past 
few years. In recent years, the topics of Telegram channels have be-
come considerably more diverse, and a significant part of them to-
day are personal blogs, channels devoted to business and start-ups, 
humor, leisure, and entertainment (see Appendix 3: Telegram chan-
nels by topic). However, political and news channels (the content of 
which largely consists of political news and which mostly function as 
political channels) have the largest number of subscribers, especially 
considering the number of views and the citation index. Taking into 
account the average number of views per Telegram post, based on the 
results for the entire year 2018, political channels occupy almost the 
entire top ten of the most popular Telegram channels (see Rating of 
the top 30 channels from Medialogia24). The number of subscribers 
may contain a large percentage of bots or inactive users; however, the 
number of views and the citation index show that political and news 
channels occupy the leading positions among the Telegram channels. 
This indicates the activity, involvement, and interest of the audience 
of Telegram’s political segment. It also means that active users read 
political channels and news channels with mostly political content 
on purpose.
However, perhaps the main evidence that Telegram channels have 
become one of the main sources of information and an alternative to 
the traditional media in Russia today is not the size of the audience or 
even the viewing statistics, but the fact that many large media outlets 
(both traditional and new) and SNS actively refer to information ob-
tained via Telegram channels (See Appendices 1 and 2). The media 
which refer to posts in Telegram channels are mostly either opposi-
24 “Telegram-kanaly: 2018 god”. [Telegram channels: 2018]. Available at:   https://www.
mlg.ru/ratings/socmedia/telegram/6430/ (accessed 8 June 2019).
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tional or critical of the ruling authorities in Russia (for instance, Echo 
Moskvy, Medusa, Novaya Gazeta). Nezavisimaya Gazeta has even 
a special weekly review of Telegram channels, which essentially 
represents a digest of the most interesting publications in Telegram 
about political events in the Russian regions. However, publications 
in Telegram channels are referred to not only by opposition and the 
liberal media, but also by relatively neutral and even pro-governmen-
tal ones (for example, by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, RIA Novosti, TASS). 
Telegram channels are playing an increasingly important role for the 
larger media, as they act as a source of content, follow political top-
ics relevant to society, and give an understanding of the mood of 
key audiences. The anonymity of the Telegram channels seriously 
complicates administrative and/or criminal prosecution against their 
authors,25 which allows anonymous bloggers to express their opin-
ions on burning issues more openly and receive feedback in the form 
of further subscriptions to the channel.26 All this makes Telegram 
an important source of influence on public opinion, for which and 
within which there is a serious struggle going on between different 
influence groups.
2. The Expansion of the Russian Ruling Elite  
into Telegram
The Russian ruling elite started to realize the importance of Telegram 
as an information environment in 2016, the year in which Telegram 
channels boomed in Russia and it became hard not to notice their 
influence on public opinion. Up to this point, Telegram had attract-
ed scant attention from the Russian authorities besides the security 
25 But this possibility, however, cannot be completely excluded, especially considering 
the recently passed bill (in March 2019) on fake news and contempt of the authorities 
and police raids and investigations aimed at revealing the identity of the author of the 
StalinGulag channel, one of the largest and most critical political Telegram channels.
26 Some Telegram bloggers have even created special channels for feedback and commu-
nication with their subscribers.
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services, since secret chats had been often used by oppositionists, 
radicals, and terrorists to coordinate and conduct their actions. In ad-
dition, the establishment was concerned with the appearance of leaks 
in the channels, which clearly indicated that information in some 
cases was coming from well-informed insiders. The lack of control 
over these channels caused serious concerns in the Kremlin. Accord-
ing to a study conducted by Project, this was further complicated by 
the fact that the team of Sergei Kiriyenko, who had become the first 
deputy chief of staff of the Russian Presidential Administration in 
October 2016, was tasked with planning and preparing for the 2018 
presidential elections, and any leakage of unwanted information27 to 
the press and social media could make this task more difficult.28 Af-
ter the 2011–2013 protests, the Kremlin started to carefully monitor 
the public mood on the Internet and sought to take control of SNS, 
which, apparently, completely succeeded with the most popular Rus-
sian SNS – Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki.29 However, at that time 
27 Such information was especially often published by the channel Nezgyar, the level of 
awareness of which allowed to conclude that the source of its information belonged to 
the highest ruling circles.
28 Rubin, Mikhail; Badanin, Roman. Telega iz Kremlja. Rasskaz o tom, kak vlasti pre-
vratili Telegram v televizor. [Telega (Telega is a colloquial name for Telegram and 
sounds like “cart” in Russian – A.S.) from the Kremlin. A story about how the authori-
ties turned Telegram into a TV set]. Available at:   https://www.proekt.media/narrative/
telegram­kanaly/ (accessed 8 June 2019).
29 From the very beginning of their existence, Vkonakte and Odnoklassniki have been 
working hand in glove with the Russian security forces and, at their request, have been 
sharing with them users’ personal information (links). However, starting from August 
1, 2014, these SNS have been obliged to provide information about users at the request 
of the Russian security services already according to the “information security law” 
(2014). This law prescribes that the Internet companies, SNS, other sites, and bloggers 
with more than 3 000 subscribers be required to allow Russian authorities access to 
users’ information and to connect special equipment and software that will allow Rus-
sian special services to access the actions of Internet users and track user activity. The 
resolution prohibits websites from disclosing “organizational and technical methods 
of conducting active search measures.” In practice, this law has been selectively enfor-
ced with respect to bloggers, and was repealed in 2017. On July 31, 2014, the Russian 
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed Government Decree No. 743, according to 
which SNS, forums, and any websites accessible to all Internet users must connect 
special equipment and software for the Russian security forces. With the help of this 
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Telegram remained terra incognita for the Russian authorities. Read-
ing anonymous Telegram channels coming into vogue caused them 
serious concern because they had not yet learned to work within the 
informational environment.30 In the meantime, Telegram channels 
were gaining dozens and then hundreds of thousands of subscribers. 
Aware of the growing popularity and influence of Telegram channels, 
the Russian establishment began its expansion into the messaging 
media environment. It was carried out in different ways and on differ-
ent levels of the Russian establishment. First of all, the press services 
of many state departments started to monitor the most popular politi-
cal channels and include the most significant content in the press di-
gests for their heads. The fact that this practice exists even within the 
highest echelons of the Russian authorities is evidenced by the state-
ments of Dmitry Peskov, the head of the presidential press service. 
According to him, the presidential press service tracks publications 
in the most well-known social and political channels of Telegram and 
prepares a special digest of the most significant content for Vladimir 
Putin.31 Moreover, before making an official decision on blocking 
Telegram, Putin’s press secretary used his own Telegram channel to 
hold conference calls, where he answered journalists’ questions.
equipment and software, it will be possible to automatically receive information about 
the actions of users of these sites. The scheme works similarly to SORM (System for 
Operative Investigative Activities). Representatives of the Internet industry were not 
familiarized with the final text of the law, and it is also unknown who will install the 
equipment. Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 743 of July 
31, 2014 (the “Rules of Cooperation for Pure Internet Service Providers”) Publis-
hed: August 11, 2014 in Rossiyskaya Gazeta – Federal edition number 6451. “Reso-
lution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 743 of July 31, 2014”. [the 
“Rules of Cooperation for Honest Internet Service Providers”]. Available at: https://
rg.ru/2014/08/04/internet­dok.html (accessed 8 June 2019).
30 Ibid. 
31 “V Kremle monitorjat osnovnye Telegram­kanaly, no ne pereocenivajut ih” [The 
Kremlin monitors the main Telegram channels but does not overestimate their qu-
ality]. Available at:   https://tass.ru/obschestvo/4589758 (accessed 8 June 2019); 
“Peskov: novosti Telegram-kanalov popadajut v dajdzhest dlja Putina, esli togo stojat” 
[Peskov: news from Telegram channels end up in digests for Putin, if they are worth 
it]. Available at:   https://tass.ru/politika/4866702 (accessed 8 June 2019).
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However, the Russian authorities moved beyond the monitoring 
of Telegram channels, and in 2016 and 2017 several federal and re-
gional agencies began to use it as a communication channel. By this 
time, many Russian federal and regional government agencies had 
started their own official Telegram channels. For instance, from 2016 
to the blocking of Telegram in April 2018, the Russian Foreign Min-
istry, the Press Service of the President of Russia, the Investigative 
Committee, and the United Russia political party had created and 
used their own Telegram channels. News would sometimes break on 
the Telegram channels of these departments earlier than on their of-
ficial sites. As a result, posts in Telegram channels became the main 
information source for the media. However, after the official decision 
to block Telegram, departmental channels were instructed to stop us-
ing it. As a result, most of the state Telegram channels, such as Vesti, 
TASS, and RIA Novosti, exist no longer or are no longer updated. 
However, the Telegram channels of many members of the Russian 
establishment continue to function — such as the channels of Head 
of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, Russia Today’s editor­
in-chief Margarita Simonyan, the Liberal Democratic Party leader 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and the well­known pro­Putin TV host and 
one of the leading Russian propagandists Vladimir Solovyov.
Another, and perhaps more common, way the authorities use Tele-
gram channels has been the unofficial funding of individual anony-
mous channels, or payment for certain publications in the most popu-
lar political channels. According to the independent media resource 
Project, which investigated the Kremlin’s influence on anonymous 
Telegram channels, the administration of the President had allocated 
a budget for expansion into Telegram at the end of 2016.32 According 
to the Project investigation, the Kremlin did not create its own chan-
32 Rubin, Mikhail; Badanin, Roman. Telega iz Kremlja. Rasskaz o tom, kak vlasti pre-
vratili Telegram v televizor. [Telega (Telega is a colloquial name for Telegram and 
sounds like ‘cart’ in Russian – A.S.) from the Kremlin. A story about how the authori-
ties turned Telegram into a TV set]. Available at:   https://www.proekt.media/narrative/
telegram­kanaly/ (accessed 8 June 2019).
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nels, but hired contractors to spread the “right” kind of information 
through popular existing channels. For example, Kremlin contractors 
were former members of the Nashi (“Ours”) movement, including 
the former press secretary of this organization, Christina Potupchik.33 
Under her leadership, entire networks, including groups of channels, 
started appearing and writing the “right” posts and reposting each 
other. This group included such channels as Akitilop, Ortega, and 
Polnyj P. The channels 338 and Media Technologist are said to be 
also connected to former members of Nashi.34
According to Project, many large Telegram channels represent, 
in one way or another, the interests of certain Kremlin influence 
groups.35 For example, Igor Sechin and the state corporation Ros-
neft are said to be backing the channel Karaulny. Nezygar channel 
is associated with the curator of Kremlin’s information policy Alex-
ey Gromov. Mash and Boilernaya channels are said to relate to the 
Kovalchuk brothers, old friends and business partners of Vladimir 
Putin.36 Apparently, some political groups and security forces use 
Telegram channels to fight their rivals (leaking confidential infor-
mation, mudslinging), and to promote their own position and politi-
cal agenda. So, for example, in mid-November 2018, the channels 
controlled (according to unofficial sources) by the former spokes-
man for Putin and Medvedev, now Kremlin curator of information 
policy Alexey Gromov,37  “The Man Behind the Kremlin’s Control 
33 In 2019, Christina Potupchik published a book on Telegram titled “The ‘Forbidden’ 
Telegram. A Guide to the Scandalous Messenger” (Potupchik, Kristina. «Zapreshhen-
nyj» Telegram. Putevoditel’ po samomu skandal’nomu internet-messendzheru. M.: 
Buki Vedi, 2019).
34 Rubin, Mikhail; Badanin, Roman. Telega iz Kremlja. Rasskaz o tom, kak vlasti pre-
vratili Telegram v televizor. [Telega (Telega is a colloquial name for Telegram and 
sounds like “cart” in Russian – A.S.) from the Kremlin. A story about how the authori-
ties turned Telegram into a TV set]. Available at:   https://www.proekt.media/narrative/
telegram­kanaly/ (accessed 8 June 2019).
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Alexey Gromov is the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of 
Russia and is in charge of the media.
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of the Russian Media,”38 disseminated information that Andrey Ya-
rin39 (a subordinate to the Kremlin’s “systemic liberal” and curator of 
the internal policy Sergey Kiriyenko40) had been reprimanded by the 
leadership for incompetent performance and poor results in the re-
gional elections. An answer came back immediately. The channels af-
filiated with the Kremlin’s internal political bloc and the Kovalchuks 
Kremlin clan (supporting Kiriyenko) – Bojlernaja, Mediatehnolog, 
IA Steklomoj, and Karaulnyj – reported that Yarin has no problems 
and that there could be no problems in principle.41 How can these 
information leaks in Telegram be interpreted, and who benefits from 
throwing a scandalous topic into the public sphere? The main target 
of the mudslinging apparently was not Andrey Yarin, a little-known 
and less powerful official, but Sergey Kiriyenko, his boss. Kiriyenko 
and Gromov are colleagues, they occupy similar and equal positions 
in the presidential administration, but they cannot be called allies, 
because they belong to different power groups and are fighting over 
spheres of influence. So, the cause of the alleged conflict between 
Gromov and Kiriyenko­Kovalchuk could be a struggle for influence 
in the media sphere: in the presidential administration, Gromov over-
sees traditional media (newspapers, TV), while Kiriyenko’s area of 
responsibility is digital media, the Internet, and social media. The 
Kovalchuk clan  controls a number of large Russian media: for in-
stance, in the media holding “National Media Group,” which in-
cludes the shares of REN TV, Pervyj kanal (Channel One Russia), 
38 Rubin, Mikhail; Zholobova, Maria; Badanin, Roman. Master of Puppets The Man 
Behind the Kremlin’s Control of the Russian Media. Available at:  https://www.proekt.
media/portrait/alexey­gromov­eng/ (accessed 8 June 2019).    
39 Andrey Yarin is the Head of the Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate.
40 Sergey Kiriyenko is the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration 
of Russia in charge of the internal politicy.
41 Rubin, Mikhail; Badanin, Roman. Telega iz Kremlja. Rasskaz o tom, kak vlasti pre-
vratili Telegram v televizor. [Telega (Telega is a colloquial name for Telegram and 
sounds like “cart” in Russian – A.S.) from the Kremlin. A story about how the authori-
ties turned Telegram into a TV set]. Available at:   https://www.proekt.media/narrative/
telegram­kanaly/ (accessed 8 June 2019).
101
Alexey Salikov. Telegram as a Means of Political Communication and its use by Russia’s Ruling Elite
Pjatyj kanal (Channel Five Russia), STS, Izvestia newspaper, and 
other media, a substantial part of the shares are owned directly by 
Yuri Kovalchuk. This example shows that it is wrong to consider 
the ruling elite as homogeneous. The members of the ruling elite are 
far from having the same interests and they can have very different 
points of view on many issues, including those different from the offi-
cial position of the Kremlin. However, with the power vertical and an 
extremely clear “friend or foe” behavioral pattern, different wings in 
the ruling elite cannot openly express their opinions and discuss their 
differences and disagreements: they must show unity in the face of 
the ruling power. Therefore, they are bound to use some other com-
munication channels, and Telegram is ideal for this. These separate 
groups, or clans, are also fighting to control the information field, 
as evidenced by the words of the editor-in-chief of one of the most 
popular near-political Telegram channels, Kremlevskij Mamkoved 
(@kremlin_mother_expert), who claims that there is a political order 
issued by the Kremlin to control the information realm.42 According 
to this popular blogger, about half of the political Telegram channels 
have been doing the Kremlin’s bidding, rotating between “honest” 
posts based on more or less reliable facts presented from their own 
political standpoint to paid progovernment posts.43
The corruptibility of Telegram channels has been confirmed by 
the Project study, during which a researcher offered money to the 
owners of a few popular political channels to post information he 
would feed them. It turned out that a significant number of the politi-
cal channels were ready to publish almost any information, only the 
42 “Messendzher razryvaet ot kolichestva informatsii. Intervju glavreda telegram kanala 
Kremlevskij mamkoved”. [The messenger is suffering from information explosion. 
Interview with the chief editor of Telegram channel Kremlin mamkoved]. Available 
at: https://360tv.ru/news/tekst/messendzher-razryvaet-ot-kolichestva-informatsii-in-
tervju-glavreda-telegram-kanala-kremlevskij-mamkoved/ (accessed 8 June 2019).
43 Ibid.
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prices had differed.44 It is possible not only to buy the publication of 
certain information, but to also block publications on a specific topic, 
such as criticism of the authorities. In this sense, the Russian ruling 
elite can be quite satisfied with the current state of Telegram channels, 
since they lack solid principles and can be manipulated for money, 
which the Russian establishment can easily afford. In the opinion of 
the Project research group, the presidential elections showed an un-
expected loyalty from many usually not-so-loyal Russian Telegram 
channels. Most of these channels wrote quite positively about the 
elections. Such loyalty, the researchers believe, was, most likely, not 
accidental, but the result of pro-Kremlin forces meddling with those 
Telegram channels.45
One of the programs of the progovernment, but officially inde-
pendent, non-profit “Institute for Internet Development” (“Institut 
razvitija interneta,” IRI), which, according to the RBC agency, has 
been training regional authorities to work with social media, includ-
ing Telegram, since February 2019, indicates that the authorities have 
been using Telegram even if it is officially banned in Russia. As a part 
of this program, regional elites have learned how to start and develop 
anonymous Telegram channels. Such projects to train regional man-
agers to work with Telegram show that the Kremlin is fully aware of 
the importance of this medium of political communication and has 
been trying to seize the initiative in its use from non-state actors. As a 
result, the teams of many regional managers now include specialists 
responsible for social media who monitor the main federal and re-
gional political channels and maintain at least one anonymous Tele-
gram channel. Currently, regional governors allocate special funding 
44 Rubin, Mikhail; Badanin, Roman. Telega iz Kremlja. Rasskaz o tom, kak vlasti pre-
vratili Telegram v televizor. [Telega (Telega is a colloquial name for Telegram and 
sounds like “cart” in Russian – A.S.) from the Kremlin. A story about how the authori-
ties turned Telegram into a TV set]. Available at:   https://www.proekt.media/narrative/
telegram-kanaly/ (accessed 8 June 2019).
45 Ibid. 
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for work with social media, and they support loyal media both direct-
ly and indirectly.46 Perhaps that is why Telegram, despite blocking 
attempts, has still been working consistently in Russia. The cause of 
the conflict between Telegram and the Russian authorities seems not 
to be the intention of the latter to completely stop its operation in the 
country but rather to control it. 
Conclusions and Discussion
This study has shown that Telegram and its channels are an important 
means of political communication, which are actively and diversely 
used by the Russian establishment and political interest groups. First, 
Telegram is used as an information channel for presenting official 
viewpoints (many officials have their own channels, including the 
Press Secretary for the President of Russia Dmitry Peskov, or Head 
of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov). Second, the Russian au-
thorities use Telegram as a source of information about the public 
mood, about opposition activists, and to monitor various kinds of 
political activity on the Internet, including the organization of protest 
movements and demonstrations. Third, Telegram is considered by the 
political elite of Russia as an effective means of influencing public 
opinion by manipulating news feeds and news bias, leaking informa-
tion, creating fake news, and throwing dirt; presenting pro-govern-
mental points of view to a wider audience; and reaching out to some 
difficult, but very important parts of Russian population – young, 
46 One example is the press service of the governor of the Kaliningrad region, described 
by Vadim Khlebnikov in the article “The Ministry of Trolling: How Alikhanov’s Team 
is Fighting on the Internet,” published by the news portal New Kaliningrad. Accor-
ding to the article, the governor’s press service was involved in creating at least three 
Telegram channels that support the policy of the current governor Anton Alikhanov 
and harshly criticize his rivals and regional liberals (Khlebnikov, Vadim. Ministerst-
vo trollinga: kak komanda alikhanova voyuet v internete. Available at:  https://www.
newkaliningrad.ru/news/politics/20351854-ministerstvo-trollinga-kak-komanda-alik-
hanova-voyuet-v-internete.html (accessed 8 June 2019).
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well-educated, and political active urban dwellers. Fourth, Telegram 
channels are used by the Russian political elite to eliminate external 
and internal political rivals by publishing compromising materials or 
rumors and for horizontal communication between different power 
groups. Fifth, Telegram is used as a channel of vertical communica-
tion within the political elite itself, which is of particular importance 
in the power vertical and, given the lack of feedback, between higher 
and lower layers of the ruling political elite. All these ways of using 
Telegram by the Russian political elite testify to its important func-
tion as a secure and effective channel of communication, the need for 
which only increases with the tightening of the regime. This means 
that Telegram and its channels will retain their significant role as a 
crucial means of political communication in the coming years. 
Even though the conclusions made in this article are based on the 
consolidation, summary, and analysis of all available open-source in-
formation on the use of Telegram by the Russian ruling elite, they re-
main largely hypothetical and require further theoretical and empiri-
cal research. First of all, we would need an empirical verification for 
the thesis that Telegram is used by various groups of the ruling elite 
as a channel for exchanging signals with each other. This requires a 
coherent analysis of content on Telegram channels, an analysis of 
connections between different channels (via reposts, references, etc.), 
and the identification, based on this analysis, of groups of channels 
connected by a common strategy and finding out whose elite group 
interests these channels represent. The thesis concerning the influ-
ence of information disseminated in Telegram on the public opin-
ion in Russia also needs empirical verification. In order to meet this 
goal, it would be necessary to analyze the cases when publications 
in Telegram channels sparked off public debate in the Russian public 
sphere, as well as to evaluate the significance of these discussions for 
the formation of public opinion in the country.
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Appendix 1. Top-10 most-cited Telegram Channels. 
N Channel Times cited, (thousands) Content category
1. Незыгарь (Nezygar)
@russica2 701,78 Politics
2. Mash
@breakingmash 699,02 News & Mass media
3. Футляр от виолончели  
(Futlyar ot violoncheli)
@rospress
649,47 Politics
4. Караульный (Karaulny)
@karaulny 636,85 Politics
5. 360tv
@tv360ru
542,07 News & Mass media
6. Медиатехнолог (Mediatechnolog)
@mediatech 448,93 Politics
7. Бойлерная (Boilernaya)
@boilerroomchannel 418,30 Politics
8. avast
@aavst55 394,87 Politics
9. 338
@go338
378,67 Politics
10. RT на русском (RT in Russian)
@rt_russian 365,28 News & Mass media
Data source: Tеlegram Analytics service, https://tgstat.ru.
Appendix 2. Top-10 most-cited Telegram Channels in the Russian Media.
N Channel Times cited Content Category
1. Mash
@breakingmash 43 982 News & Mass media
2. Kadyrov_95
@Rkadyrov_95
8 347 Politics
3. Незыгарь (Nezygar)
@russica2 7 697 Politics
4. Life Shot
@Lshot 7 212 News & Mass media
5. Directorate 4
@directorate4 6 661 News & Mass media
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N Channel Times cited Content Category
6. WarGonzo
@wargonzo 4 793 News & Mass media
7. Мутко против (Mutko protiv)
@offsider 
3 373 Health & Sport
8. Super
@SuperRu- 3 241 News & Mass media
9. Павел Чиков (Pavel Chikov)
@pchikov 2 410 Politics
10. Владимир Жириновский (Vladi-
mir Zhirinovsky)  
@zhirinovskylive 
1 599 Politics
Data source: 2018 rating by Medialogia.47
Appendix 3. Telegram channels in Russia by topic, %  
(as of December 2018). 
Data source: Tеlegram Analytics service, https://tgstat.ru.
47 “Telegram-kanaly: 2018 god”. [Telegram channels: 2018]. Available at:   https://www.
mlg.ru/ratings/socmedia/telegram/6430/ (accessed 8 June 2019).
